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Abstract: This paper provides an alternative narrative of Detroit from one of economic struggle and racial division. It instead 
discusses other forces at play, focusing on questionable moral standing and its relationship to built form, specifically the city. The 
paper explores whether a compelling claim on building’s moral use can be established, and in doing so seeks to establish a causal link 
between moral relationship and the built environment. Moral relationship is established through three main avenues. The first is a 
brief discussion of Detroit’s history, particularly its history from WWII onward, in order to establish the complex moral context into 
which this argument is situated. The second avenue provides a concise summary of Stanley Cavell’s moral framework and discusses 
the conundrum of having moral obligation in the absence of moral relationship. The final avenue is a look to the famous Renaissance 
Center as emblematic of the moral relationship at play. The resulting form of analysis relies on the premises that buildings can embody 
the knowledge and agreement required for (moral) relationship, and that buildings are artifacts of moral relationship. The paper 
concludes that buildings are therefore morally appraisable, which is to say they can be appraised for their moral appropriateness.
Keywords: urban planning, architecture, ethics, Detroit, housing, economics, justice, morality, philosophy, Cavell.
The dying was a slow process, but in the midst of urban decay fresh life sprouts, like seeds 
from garbage on a compost heap. The new vision that made the new life possible gave 
a positive value to all the negations and defeats that the tried peoples had experienced.
- Lewis Mumford, The City in History1
Fig. 1. Derelict warehouse with Renaissance Center beyond showcases the 
city’s economic disparity (Source: Scott Hocking)
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Introduction
Detroit’s story as one of economic struggle and racial 
division is well-known and publicized. The story re-
cently added a new chapter as national and interna-
tional attention renewed when the car manufacturers 
faced bankruptcy that resulted in a number of con-
troversial federal buyouts. The attention generating 
phenomenon known as ruin porn, has been fueled in 
part by photographers such as Camilio Jose Vergara 
(see Fig. 1 for an example of the type of photographs 
circulating the global media). The photographs provide 
a safe vantage point for the global spectator to follow 
Detroit’s ruination. An explanation of Detroit’s decline 
from car manufacturer mecca is commonly portrayed 
as a series of economic woes further complicated by 
extreme racial division. This paper provides an al-
ternative narrative discussing other forces at play, 
with a focus on questionable moral standing and its 
relationship to built form, specifically the city.2 The 
paper will explore whether a compelling claim on 
building’s moral use can be established, and in doing 
so it will seek to establish a causal link between moral 
relationship and the built environment. Moral rela-
tionship will be established through three main aven-
ues. The first is a brief discussion of Detroit’s history, 
particularly its history from WWII onward, in order 
to establish the complex moral context into which this 
argument is situated. This analysis relies heavily on 
Thomas Sugrue’s seminal text The Origins of the Urban 
Crisis because the analysis and content is uniquely well 
situated for making moral arguments, as Sugrue high-
lights not just what was done but what could have been 
done. The second avenue provides a concise summary 
of Stanley Cavell’s moral framework as presented in 
his seminal 1979 text The Claim of Reason and dis-
cusses the conundrum of having moral obligation 
without moral relationship. The final avenue is a look 
to the famous Renaissance Center as emblematic of 
the moral relationship at play. While this analysis does 
not negate the role of economics and race in Detroit’s 
story, it does seek to add moral questions largely un-
dealt with in popular accounts. Making this analysis 
not just an original contribution to understanding 
morality in architecture and urbanism, but an original 
contribution to the story of Detroit’s decline.
Boundaries of Morality
Despite popular attributions of Detroit’s urban deteri-
oration and negligence as caused by the decline of the 
auto industry are in combination with extreme racial 
tension – both of which certainly did negatively im-
pact the socio-cultural environment – urban histor-
ians, sociologists, and political scientists tell a much 
different story of Detroit’s decline (Romney 2008: 
A35; Maynard, Blunkley 2008: B1; Hackman 2014).3 
Amongst the key points the popular accounts overlook 
is that Detroit has been in decline since at least 1950, 
and there is no direct correlation between racial ten-
sions, namely the race riots, in affecting the population 
decline (as is evidenced by the U.S. Census records). 
Yet, there is a strong correlation between job loss and 
population decline, likely due to the highly centralized 
economy (Sugrue 1996).
The post-war economy was centered on car manu-
facturing, serving as the largest national producer of 
cars. The removal of corporate obligations to employ-
ees and locale as well as the introduction of new trade 
boundaries restructured the economy creating no need 
or desire for highly concentrated manufacturing. Thus 
it appears the major population declines were caused 
by war and changes in economic structures. The first 
population dip occurred in the early 1940s with the 
drafting of soldiers for WWII. The Vietnam War had 
a similar effect in the 1960s, but was compounded by 
the deunionization of corporate employees and grow-
ing suburbanization (U.S. Census).4 More recently 
in the late 1990s and 2000s, neoliberal’s 1994 North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) decimated 
Detroit and the Rust Belt region’s economy as it gave 
the right to trade freely within a large geographic area, 
effectively restructuring the local economies through 
the region and dispersing former concentrations, such 
as Detroit.
Definitive amongst urban historical accounts of 
Detroit, Thomas Sugrue’s The Origins of the Urban 
Crisis, provides a detailed analysis depicting Detroit’s 
elected and appointed officials as holding key respons-
ibility for the declining appearance and functionality 
of the city’s buildings and infrastructure. The actions 
underpinning the decline, as Sugrue demonstrates, can 
be found in the formation of critical public policies. The 
painstaking detail Sugrue provides, echoes many of 
the patterns also accounted for in the 1968 report, also 
known as the Kerner Report.5 Sugure’s analysis differs 
from the report in that it focuses on the particular his-
tory of Detroit. Sugrue ultimately does not establish the 
fairly obvious symptoms of poverty, but rather works 
to undercover the causes. For Sugrue one of the major 
causes is the systematic isolation of minority groups 
from local, state, and federal support whether in the 
form of democratic representation or direct subsidies 
such as Federal Housing Act (FHA) loans, both readily 
made use of by mainstream groups.
The alternative narrative of Detroit’s urban history 
begins with democratic representation. Detroit’s polit-
ical structure was insufficiently stratified to represent 
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the different groups present within the city, which 
precluded the already marginalized groups from par-
taking in “decisions having community-wide effect” 
(Marger 1979: 343). The lack of democratic represent-
ation precluded marginalized groups not only from 
having a policy-based relationship with the city that 
could benefit them; it precluded them from protecting 
their rights and promoting their interests as citizens. 
Those that did have such a relationship fully utilized 
its power to their personal advantage at the exclusion 
of others.
The majority developed a compelling ideological 
position supporting their group’s specific socio-eco-
nomic interests. The majority wanted to secure their 
own economic progress as well as their idea of good so-
ciety. As a group, they were well-organized, articulate 
and ultimately effective in getting what they wanted. 
Sugrue briefly describes the generation: “In reaction 
to the economic and racial transformation of the city, 
Detroit’s whites began fashioning a politics of defensive 
localism that focused on threats to property and neigh-
borhood” (Sugrue 1996: 210). The majority drew on 
defensive localism, or exclusionary practices, to justify 
decision-making across the city. Most notably, such de-
cisions included building neither housing – as recom-
mended by experts in the midst of a known housing 
shortage – nor implementing other potentially useful 
public policies designed to address the growing hous-
ing crisis within the city (Sugrue 1996).
The severe economic marginalization of African 
Americans meant that they struggled to find equal 
opportunity in education, employment, and housing. 
In many instances, the economic obstacles manifested 
as explicit racism. Employers hired African Americans 
less frequently or not at all. When employers did hire 
African Americans, the positions were usually the 
lowest ranking, independent of knowledge, skill, or 
incumbency. Furthermore, education remained leg-
ally segregated until 1955, after the Brown v. Board of 
Education case, yet at the same time, the cost of uni-
versity tuition remained prohibitive for most. Implicit 
racism, or institutionalized racism, was increasingly 
relied upon as overt racism became illegal or increas-
ingly socially unacceptable. In the case of housing, the 
1934 FHA policy was a progressive act to help middle 
and working class Americans secure a place on the 
housing ladder as never before. The act provided sub-
sidies and access to affordable mortgages that allowed 
many Americans to purchase homes that would not 
otherwise have access to. The loans were a critical com-
ponent in the post war housing boom. Yet, the federal 
loans were largely inaccessible for African Americans 
to secure, because banks and realtors remained un-
trusting of the African American community (Sugrue 
1996; Kanner 2013). Practices such as redlining insured 
unequal access to funds. Thus, African Americans re-
mained barricaded behind invisible administrative 
and institutional walls, as opposed to the barriers of 
legislated segregation and slavery.
The African American struggle to secure an in-
come meant they could not simultaneously seek out 
the training necessary to seek out better employment 
options. Doubly, the people could not access federal 
assistance to secure mortgages for adequate housing. 
In cases when all these obstacles were overcome, the 
people faced fierce local opposition to homeownership 
in white working-class and middle-class neighbor-
hoods. Preclusion from economic opportunity robbed 
an entire population of not just economic mobility but 
economic ability. The result was catastrophic, as the 
African American populations in Detroit suffered 
widespread economic deprivation resulting in decades 
long community blight. Cities across the country faced 
the same effects of FHA loans and the discriminatory 
practices of its administration, but Detroit seems to 
have suffered most severely due to inaccessible housing 
loans and a combination of other less significant factors 
(Gordon 2005).
The lack of unequal access to education, employment, 
and housing often manifested most clearly in unequal 
access to urban space. African Americans were pre-
cluded from freely participating in the housing market, 
which prevented them from living in the same neighbor-
hoods, attending the same community and civic venues, 
and obtaining access to the same services and amenities. 
The restrictions manifested themselves quite clearly as 
neighborhoods were self-segregating, and although the 
population of the city continued to decline, the city’s 
demographic majority became African American. 
Perhaps the clearest manifestation of unequal access to 
urban space is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the 
majority white population on one side of the famous 
8 Mile road, and the majority African American on the 
other. The 8 Mile road became the physical represent-
ation of hypersegregation between the white and black 
neighborhoods, becoming so culturally entrenched in 
the psyche of Detroiters that songs, such as Eminem’s 8 
Mile, were written about the role this road plays in the 
cultural landscape of the city. Interestingly enough, the 
socio-cultural organization on either side of this road 
results in physical implications, as the two sides are phys-
ically quite different. In any case, that the socio-cultural 
and geographic configuration exists is well-known and 
documented, but that it can largely be attributed to the 
inability of African Americans to fully participate in the 
economy and housing market is not.6
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Perhaps the most visually apparent complication 
of Detroit’s development pertains to the affordable 
housing shortage documented by sociologists, political 
scientists, and economists. Already in 1942, Detroit 
had been struggling to keep up with the demands of 
a rapidly growing population and address the con-
sequences of its effects (Woodford 1942: E10). The 
city’s housing demand was high during the height of 
the manufacturing booms, which caused a corollary 
population boom – roughly from 1940 to the early 
1950s (see Table 1). As a result, public services were 
stretched and housing and planning policies were ill-
equipped to deal with the quickly changing social de-
mands. The city suffered from managerial retardants, 
such as inadequate land use and zoning policies unable, 
for instance, to prevent residential areas from rapidly 
turning into business districts (Marger 1979). The city’s 
population and economic growth created residential 
districts overrun by new business districts and land use 
was that rapidly shifting (Marger 1979). Of particular 
interest is the city’s inability to mitigate the growing 
housing shortage (Sugrue 1996; Kanner 2013).
Key in Detroit’s alternative narrative is the city 
planning and management’s lack of response to the 
changing city, which this paper argues brings the status 
of moral relationship critically into question. Clearly 
documented evidence shows that the city’s officials 
and administrators actively refused opportunities to 
respond to changing needs and demands of its popu-
lation (Woodford 1942: E10; Seigel 1997: A5). Without 
democratic representation of the city’s marginalized 
minorities and poor (often the same groups), proposed 
projects and policies responding to growing housing 
demands were not adopted or otherwise implemented. 
The proposed building projects and policies were in-
tended to stave off the spread of poverty, but there was 
direct opposition. Sugrue attests that:
In cities like Detroit, social reformers and 
federal officials fought to erect public hous-
ing sufficient to meet the needs of those 
whom the market failed to serve. But public 
housing advocates were repeatedly stymied 
by homeowners who asserted their own in-
terpretations of New Deal social policy. They 
demanded that the government privilege 
[sic] the stability of their ownership, over 
and above its support for public housing 
(Sugrue 1996: 59).
Staunch in their belief that their intentions were 
good, the manifestation of defensive localism forti-
fied a steadfast institutional wall preventing African 
Americans access to housing and the most funda-
mental element of individual economic stability within 
American society. Although admittedly housing itself 
could not have wholly solved perennially high unem-
ployment rates, housing options would have stabilized 
living conditions for the poor, thereby reducing the 
depths of urban decay that came with social neglect and 
abandonment (McDougall 1987: 741–742). Housing in-
accessibility acted as a strong and direct force enacting 
on the physical shaping of Detroit.
The government led initiatives to renew urban cen-
ters via the Housing Acts of 1934, 1949, 1954, and 1959. 
The program implemented an idealized, context-less 
development program known as urban renewal that 
was founded on the belief that simply removing 
blighted areas would solve the problem of decay. In 
this regard, urban renewal fundamentally operates on 
a belief in physical determinism, in that the physical 
removal of buildings was thought to solve the social 
Fig.  2. Present day residences across the city by racial distribution reveals stark 
boundaries between white and african american as well as a marked lack of white 
residents overall. Blue dots indicate white residents and green african american. 
(Source: Dustin Cable, Demographics Research Group Weldon Center for Public 
Service, university of Virginia).
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problems they displayed. Whether one believes in phys-
ical or environmental determinism in practice, the pro-
gram’s apathy toward the lives of those affected by the 
policies was explicit, and the effects on the wider City 
of Detroit unambiguously negative.
The Kerner Report reports that urban renewal “has 
demolished more housing than it has erected” (1968: 
480). Since the rate at which housing was removed from 
the housing market exceeded any effort to rebuild, the 
federal program enacted to address housing conditions 
simply exacerbated the already desperate situation of 
those in need of housing. The report acknowledges that 
urban renewal initiatives were often merely displacing 
residents of blighted areas, but argues, “we believe that a 
greatly expanded re-oriented urban renewal program is 
necessary to the health of our cities” ([emphasis added] 
Kerner et. al. 1968: 480), regardless of the fact that there 
was no provision for dealing with the people displaced 
by the renewal programs. This trend of removing hous-
ing without providing or at minimum planning for an 
alternative means continued on for decades. One cit-
izen remarked as late as 1997 that she was “unhappy 
with the demolition of public housing because it left low 
income people with nowhere to go” (Seigel 1997: A5).
The lack of democratic representation, housing 
shortage due to population increase, and systematic 
demolition of unsightly housing precluded the possib-
ility of sustainable life for the economically and racially 
disadvantaged. But these factors also tell us what the 
moral relationship of the city’s officials to its most so-
cially vulnerable and economically insecure was: they 
were certain they did not have the resources available to 
help the under or poorly housed, but they did demolish 
existing housing. At times explicit displacement of 
Table 1. Social, economic, and political influence on Detroit
Political leadership Census data Potentially significant events
President Presidency Date Population Difference Detroit nation
Roosevelt (R) 1901–1909 1900 285,704 +180,062
Taft (R) 1909–1913 1910 465,766 +527,912 WWI (1914–1918)
Wilson (D) 1913–1921
Harding (R) 1921–1923 1920 993,678 +574,984
Collidge (R) 1923–1929 1929 Stock Market Crash
Hoover (R) 1929–1933 1930 1,588,662 +54,790 Great Depression (circa 1930–1945); new Deal (1933–1936)
Roosevelt (D) 1933–1945 WWII (1941–1945); 2nD Red Scare (1947–1954)
Truman (D) 1945–1953 1940 1,623,452 +226,116 Race Riots (1943)
Eisenhower (R) 1953–1961 1950 1,849,568 –179,424 Civil Rights Movement (1954–1966)
Kennedy (D) 1961–1963 1960 1,670,144 –156,081 Civil Rights Movement (1954–1966)
johnson (D) 1963–1969 Race Riots (1967) Civil Rights Movement (1954–1966)
nixon (R) 1969–1974 1970 1,514,063 –310,695
Ford (R) 1974–1977
Carter (D) 1977–1981
Reagan (R) 1981–1989 1980 1,203,368 –175,389 Economic Recession (1980–1982)
H.W. Bush (R) 1989–1993 Iraq war
Clinton (D) 1993–2009 1990 1,027,974 –79,704 north american Free Trade agreement (1994)
G.W. Bush (R) 2001–2009 2000 951,270 –237,493
Housing Market Bubble  
(2002–2009);  
Stock Market Crash (2008–2009)
obama (D) 2009–2017 2012 713,777* –12,302* General Motors Bailout (2009);
2013 688,701* –25,076* Chapter 9 Bankruptcy (2013)
*estimated populations
(Source: Population adapted from united States Census Bureau – www.uscensus.gov.)
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responsibility occurred as African Americans were 
held wholly responsible for their situation: “To white 
Detroiters, the wretched conditions in Paradise Valley 
and other poor African American neighborhoods were 
the fault of irresponsible blacks, not greedy landlords or 
neglectful city officials” (Sugrue 1996: 216). The judg-
ment-laden views of the poverty-ridden blacks effect-
ively dismissed others of any potential responsibility for 
the state or condition of the other (Wacquant 1997). In 
order to have taken the marginalized people’s position 
into account, the city – both its officials and residents – 
would have had to operate with a more inclusive or 
representative notion of the public and public interest, 
a specific instance of which would have required effect-
ively addressing the housing shortage. By position, the 
city officials held the responsibility to act in the public’s 
best interest. Yet as Sugrue shows, the city officials had 
a number of opportunities to take different courses of 
action on affordable housing and unemployment but 
actively chose otherwise due to ideological positions as 
opposed to nonnegotiable barriers.
The characterization above depicts a widespread 
preclusion of moral relationship, because the ba-
sic foundations required for moral relationship, as 
defined by Cavell, were non-existent or inoperative.7 
In order to recognize the other and take into account 
their position at all, there were certain moral oblig-
ations that would have to be upheld. Addressing the 
housing shortage with practical and effective solu-
tions through the administration of policies and le-
gislation and administrate a program to reduce the 
disparity of resource inequality apparent in the city 
would have been a requirement of upholding moral 
obligation. Instead, what little inner city affordable 
housing there was was razed. Meanwhile those able 
to secure FHA loans were buying homes in the new 
suburban developments outside the city, thereby tak-
ing with them any possibility of supporting an inner 
city economy that could support the poor or other-
wise stave off the onset of widespread poverty. Their 
movement to the suburbs was the budding residential 
ideal of the latter half of the 20th century. In this con-
figuration, in which whites are able to leave the city 
(a.k.a. the white flight), those that remained behind in 
the city were largely African American (Kerner et al. 
1968; McDougall 1987; Sugrue 1996). The result is the 
racial ghetto bluntly described in the Kerner Report 
(1968: 236), not as a result of race and economy, but 
rather of neglect and abandonment.
Un-acknowledgement
The lack of democratic representation in combination 
with an affordable housing shortage and active hous-
ing stock reductions led to a struggle for subsistence 
that was dealt with outside the mechanisms of modern 
democracy.8 The public fora, or formalized democratic 
processes of the city, state and nation, did not address 
the lack of democratic representation, the affordable 
housing shortage, or the reductions of existing housing 
stock. The result was competition between the white 
working class and African Americans of all socio-eco-
nomic strata to secure their standing in the housing 
and job markets. The outcome features amongst the 
first instances in which whites were in direct compet-
ition for the same resources as African Americans, in 
the sense that whites and blacks had not previously 
been in direct competition for the same jobs, housing, 
schools, and other essential resources. The subsequent 
denial, in that there was unequal access to these re-
sources, suggests that forces were at play keeping 
African Americans from securing equal access.
The promises made in the New Deal, begun in the 
early 20th century, raised hopes and aspirations of all 
Americans, and the civil rights movement raises the 
expectations of African Americans to take an equal 
part of the federal government’s promise to all its cit-
izens. The deal was generally a response to the Great 
Depression that was intended to both lift people out 
of poverty and prevent another major economic de-
pression. The response included a large bank bail out, 
increased market securities, and investments in social 
programs, such as social security, government employ-
ment, and minimum working standards including 
minimum wages and maximum hours. The national 
mood of entitlement and aspiration “created a sense 
of crisis among [white] homeowners. Both their eco-
nomic interests and their communal identities were 
threatened,” by the presence of African Americans in 
their neighborhoods and thereby their community 
(Sugrue 1996: 214). The crisis manifested in creating 
self-segregated neighborhoods and city abandonment, 
or the white flight, in favor of the exclusivity of the 
growing suburbs.
In an effort to define the self-identity of the two 
groups, a sociological study subsequently examined 
the aspirations of Detroit’s suburban whites helping 
to clarify the point of contestation. The study provides 
two theories for describing the compelling-ness of the 
suburbs over the city: “One theory argues that suburbs 
are vast shifting and sorting units in which the White 
middle-class person chooses a community that fits his 
values and life goals. Another theory argues for the 
changes which persons undergo once they come into 
the social world of a given community” (Marger 1979: 
337). In either, the case of selection or of socialization, 
“[Whites] fail to realize that the blacks who enter their 
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neighborhoods would resemble them in [both] social 
and economic standing” (Marger 1979: 109). Similarly, 
contemporary political historian and theorist Danielle 
Allen discusses the reoccurring powerful rhetorical 
device of oneness in the political realm. She draws 
our attention to the role the concept of unification 
and oneness played in the America’s history, focusing 
on how oneness was used in the context of school se-
gregation, and raises the question as to whether, “the 
rhetoric [was] supposed to unify, once again, Southern 
and Northern whites, or was it at last to unify white 
and black?” (Allen 2009: 15). The lack of recognition 
or the lack of oneness, amounts to a kind of disinter-
estedness serving to (self)justify the actions of moral 
autonomy from the other. The autonomy serves to up-
hold a particular form of community – a community 
that insulates itself, not just from the physical intru-
sion of perceived outsiders but, from the most basic 
moral concerns directed at and emanating from such 
outsiders. Thus, the refusal of the white community to 
recognize themselves in the other, or the refusal of a 
black and white oneness, is a core operative factor in 
the shaping of Detroit’s urban story through the latter 
half of the 20th century.
Questions of democratic representation, an ideo-
logically induced affordable housing shortage, to-
gether with evidence of actively not building housing 
and turning down opportunities to build it are not 
just practical oversights and shortcomings. There is 
activity to address the presence of the ghettos through 
urban renewal, effectively just reducing ever more the 
low-income housing supply in the midst of a huge af-
fordable housing shortage. Understanding the cumu-
lative effects of the general state of things – in terms of 
democratic representation, ideological marginaliza-
tion, employment access, housing access, little tangible 
response by the city, and federal urban renewal initiat-
ives – quite clearly accounts for the resulting abandon-
ment and self-segregation of the city. Yet, the question 
must be raised: why was there no direct and concerted 
effort to help reduce the breadth and depth of poverty 
in the city? Would such a lack of engagement with the 
poor absolve one of moral obligation to the poor?
Cavell’s moral contradiction in use
In an effort to delineate where morality and moral 
responsibility lies, the analysis looks to the moral 
philosophy of Stanley Cavell. Cavell’s moral account 
provides a conceptual framework for theorizing in 
what capacity buildings, and by extension larger seg-
ments of the built environment, can hold moral use. 
To begin with, the term use remains distinct from the 
term function often used with widely varied mean-
ings in architecture’s Modernist discourse. Rather it 
is here used in the distinctly Wittgensteinian sense. 
Wittgenstein states in the Philosophical Investigations 
“the meaning of a word is its use in the language,” 
leading us to infer that meaning is defined as use, 
which is to say, use is meaning (Wittgenstein 1951: 
§43). In application, what counts as use becomes the 
focus of investigation. In the context of architecture 
and its potential morality, the remark suggests that 
if buildings have use they have meaning. To locate 
buildings’ meaning we must first understand their 
use. Use, in this analysis, is not limited to the debates 
of architectural functionalism, which pertain to the 
development of a building aesthetic as opposed to a 
kind of forensic investigation. Whilst the investigat-
ive framework is potentially clarifying of many other 
mischaracterizations of architecture, it more signific-
antly reveals instances in which use indicates moral 
use. In other words, if there is moral use there is moral 
meaning, and similarly if there is moral meaning there 
is moral use. The goal in establishing cases in which 
buildings can be shown as having moral use, is to de-
termine whether they may serve further as a conduit 
of moral relationship. Thus, the outstanding question 
in this analysis is precisely how buildings are moral, 
which is to say for which uses buildings are taken as 
moral.9 Because if use can be located, its corollary – 
meaning – is too. But first, let us establish more firmly 
what is here, and subsequently, meant by moral and 
moral relationship.
Morality demands acceptance and mutual under-
standing, as Cavell argues in The Claim of Reason. He 
writes, “one human being confronts another in terms 
of that person’s position, and in a mode which acknow-
ledges the relation he is taking towards it,” setting the 
first criterion of moral relationship in epistemological 
terms (Cavell 1979: 325). Acknowledging requires an 
understanding of the other’s position and an under-
standing of both the position one is coming from and 
the mode in which one engages. The second criterion 
establishes which actions count as morally motivated, 
or that, “what is required in confronting another per-
son is not your liking him or her but you being willing, 
from whatever cause, to take his or her position into 
account, and bear the consequences” (Cavell 1979: 326). 
Cavell’s point is that there is no possibility of moral 
relationship, that there cannot be moral relationship 
without some knowledge of the other. Knowing re-
quires, for instance, at least some understanding of the 
person’s socio-cultural context, especially their values 
and belief systems, which is to say a kind of engagement 
with the other. Thus moral relationship is defined in 
part as knowing the other.
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However, it is not to say that if there is no en-
gagement, morality is by definition precluded. One 
can still act in such a way that one may consider 
moral without engagement, however one cannot 
have held prior moral intent nor moral relationship. 
Furthermore, engagement alone does not guarantee 
morality, for one can be in dialogue with another and 
act immorally or amorally. Instead, knowing estab-
lishes the boundaries of moral appraisal, but is not 
equated with moral action.
It is this aspect of morality in architecture that 
seems often overlooked in favor of moral appreciation 
or evaluation, yet moral relationship is both integral 
and critical to the building process. Taking another’s 
position into account and bearing the consequences 
of doing so is effectively what developers, architects, 
planners, city managers and other key stakeholders 
do, or at least ought to do when they set out to create 
a building or revitalize a neighborhood. It is their re-
sponsibility as built environment professionals to both 
know and respond to the socio-political climate in 
which the other operates. It is not just their responsib-
ility within the codes of professional ethics, but their 
moral responsibility as individuals participant in the 
relevant socio-cultural context.10
The third key criterion of moral relationship as ac-
counted for by Cavell is agreement. Cavell professes:
To the extent that responsibility is the sub-
ject of moral argument, what makes moral 
argument rational is not the assumption 
that there is in every situation one thing 
which ought to be done and that this may 
be known, nor the assumption we can always 
come to agreement about what ought to be 
done on the basis of rational methods (Cavell 
1979: 312).
Instead of mindlessly guiding our actions according 
to principles, theses and doctrines, we are left to get to 
know ourselves and one another to decipher what is 
appropriate action. The statement dismantles the as-
sumptions underpinning our universals, leading us to 
fall back on knowledge in a renewed sense. In doing so, 
the third criterion supports the first two by creating a 
mutual dependence between knowledge and acknow-
ledgement. Cavell states:
[Moral argument’s] rationality lies in follow-
ing the methods which lead to a knowledge 
of our own position, of where we stand; 
in short, to a knowledge and definition of 
ourselves (Cavell 1979: 312).
In this reality, agreement plays a critical role, sug-
gesting not only is there a kind of mutual understand-
ing required for the possibility of moral relationship, 
but that knowing oneself occurs in relationship to an-
other, in the sense that we derive an understanding of 
ourselves as a result of identifying how we differ from 
another. The ability to relate then rests on the under-
standing of self and other, without which the ability to 
secure agreement is precluded.
In use
Regarding cities and buildings, there are an infinite 
number of actions taken that implicitly, explicitly, 
tacitly, or overtly require knowing and agreement. 
The practice of building is itself a process based on a 
series of agreements (Wittgenstein 1951: §241–242).11 
Some of the agreements predate the individuals en-
acting them, such as use of certain materials, the par-
ticular compositional configuration of a floor plan, 
or a predefined decision-making process. Predating 
agreements may also describe building’s tradition 
and its conventions.12 For instance, the conventions 
of drawing a series of plans, sections and elevations 
communicating the building’s construction are based 
in prior agreement about the way of doing things. We 
could communicate building plans in languages, or 
through a series of detail drawings along with a large-
scale model. That we have chosen to use drawings in 
the way that we do is partly because of our collectively 
having done so, but certainly not entirely because it 
is objectively the most practical, obvious or only way 
of communicating the building plan. Along a similar 
vein, the particular tradition of placing a dedication 
stone on public buildings, which details the project 
date and key stakeholders in the building’s construc-
tion, is also an agreement about the way of doing 
things. The practice signals a valuing of the Western 
calendar and attribution of powerful patrons, but it is 
not a universal practice – not within Occidental cul-
ture, and certainly not across global cultures.
While there are many more types of agreement re-
lated to building than can be accounted for here, such 
agreements establish what we do, which positions 
we respond to, take into account and bear the con-
sequences of. Agreement determines:
the way in which the arena and court of play 
marks off what will count as our respons-
ibility and our concerns. The problems of 
morality then become which values we are 
to honor and create, and which responsibil-
ities we must accept, and which we have, in 
our conduct, and by our position incurred 
(Cavell 1979: 325).
The question then is what counts as the city’s con-
cern within the general boundaries of moral relation-
ship sketched out above?
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Moral contradiction in use
The concern within the general boundaries of the city’s 
moral relationship appears to be its self-defined moral 
intent and a broader overarching idea of moral rela-
tionship as defined by its citizens.13 An indication of 
the public moral stance is captures in the 1955 Spirit 
of Detroit statue. The statue figures prominently in the 
consciousness of the citizenry, and is often attributed 
as the symbol of Detroit. It’s inscription is the morally 
upstanding statement “Now the Lord is that spirit, and 
where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty,” which 
describes the beliefs, attitudes and value systems of 
the city as an institution and the people that inhabit 
it. Yet, liberty broadly construed seems to have been 
lacking in the portrayal of restricted participation in 
the economic and housing market. Taking the inscrip-
tion as an implied indication of the city’s moral stance, 
did it uphold its own values? And did it meet the ex-
pectations of the citizenry who also held these values? 
We can never know absolutely, but an appraisal of the 
city’s relationship to all its citizens can be proffered. 
One building, it is argued is particularly revealing.
Amongst the most pronounced examples of the dis-
parity is the Renaissance Center, a commercial complex 
built on the Detroit riverfront in 1977 (see Fig 3). The 
center, colloquially known as the Ren Cen, was pro-
moted for its potential to solve the problems of poverty 
and economic decline in Detroit by economic effect. 
Privately financed by investors and through fundrais-
ing events organized by heir of the Ford Company, the 
Renaissance Center was a significant private undertak-
ing.14 The desired effect to generate local capital was 
assumed to indirectly generate the broader and more 
comprehensive economic stimulation so desperately 
needed. The belief was that a better economy would in 
itself solve the city’s festering social problems rooted 
in chronic unemployment and catapult the city back 
to national and international significance. Promoting 
the project, Mayor Coleman Young is quoted as saying, 
“the entire world will see that Detroit, which was once 
declared dead, is indeed alive and well and that we have 
recovered from the maladies of our part” (Stuart 1979a: 
A10). Given this and similar claims, the building was 
presented as a partial solution to Detroit’s economic 
woes.
The economic trickle down model was widely sup-
ported, particularly by the politically conservative 
acolytes of Ronald Reagan. In some regards, the eco-
nomic model worked as there were some successes in 
stimulating economic growth. Washington Boulevard 
was renovated, and further investments were made in 
other parts of the city by the General Motors Company 
(Stuart 1978: A18; Stuart 1979a: A10; Stuart 1979b: 
A20). Yet, the project failed to meet the optimistic 
economic ambitions of the developers, investors, and 
the city, or otherwise serve as an impetus for others. 
Fig. 3. juxtaposition of a warehouse house with the Renaissance Center’s luxury hotel and conference center  
(Source: Philip Hall)
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Shortly after the completion of the project, complaints 
were reported that:
the center has “stolen” tenants from other 
downtown buildings […]. The result is 
a daytime shift of activity across down-
town, with the action moving toward the 
southeast corner toward the river where 
the Renaissance Center is located [… Thus 
the development] merely rearranged what 
downtown activity already existed (Stevens 
1977).
New investments, businesses, and jobs had not been 
created by the mere presence of the building within the 
city, resulting in the general sentiment that the project 
had not lived up to its promises. Time has shown that 
the economic upturn sought after did not come.
The building itself is sited in such a way that isol-
ates it from the city. Jefferson Avenue sits between the 
edge of downtown and the building’s entrance, oc-
cupying approximately three hundred feet in width, or 
the length of an American football field. The avenue 
is broad enough to allow for three lanes of traffic in 
either direction, with wide sidewalks and shoulders, as 
well as amply planted medians. The sheer size of the 
road, in combination with the relatively high speed of 
traffic, creates a significant barrier between the down-
town and the Renaissance Center. On the other side of 
the Renaissance Center is the riverfront of the Hudson 
River. Since there is little or no development on either 
side of the project, its placement was effectively like an 
island accessible only by car from roads quickly leading 
out of the city into the posh northeastern suburbs or 
to Ann Arbor to the west. Given the site plan’s spatial 
composition and the project’s physical isolation, there is 
little possibility for relationship with the rest of the city. 
Architectural critic Paul Goldberger’s reading is similar, 
stating that the building, “sets itself apart from Detroit, 
so dramatically that one almost feels compelled to ques-
tion the developer’s assertion that the project represents 
a ‘vote of confidence’ in the city” (Goldberger 1977: 16).
The site plan is not the only point at which the build-
ing’s spatial composition reveals the intended isolation 
from the city’s public.15 The building was not origin-
ally intended for public use, but rather for hosting the 
business and political elite. Whilst the commercial 
programming of the space may seem a practical solu-
tion, particularly given the economic aspirations of the 
project, the planning for an abundant amount of office 
and hotel space in an increasingly unpopulated city 
seems unnecessary if not excessive. The apparent excess 
is only exaggerated when considering both the low-in-
come housing shortage and the redundancy of building 
type within the downtown area, particularly in light of 
the downtown vacancy rate. Further, the building itself 
allowed limited public access, to lobby spaces only and 
where fine attire was a strictly held entry requirement. 
Given the planned use and configuration of the spaces, 
there was evidently no intention to inclusively engage 
the public. The building provided space only to those 
in the socio-economic strata that were able to afford 
the fine attire required for entry.
The idea that the investors and city officials meant 
to do nothing about the situation in Detroit is not an 
accurate description. However, what the key decision 
makers intended to do, in the case of the Renaissance 
Center, displays a superficial understanding of the 
problems faced and a primarily self-interested motiv-
ation (because of potential economic benefits). While 
it is impossible to ever conclusively know whether the 
project would have been successful had it embraced the 
reality of the city’s moral context instead of isolating 
itself to address the concerns that appeared most suited 
to their (economic) interests, what is clear is a moral 
contradiction in the promotion of the project to the 
city’s residents. The politicians and private stakeholders 
claimed the building would help everyone and create 
for everyone a better city by helping to create a better 
economy for everyone.
The stakeholders’ claim about the impact the build-
ing would have on the city and its people may not have 
had discernable moral intent but it certainly can be 
morally appraised. On the one hand the private stake-
holders of the Renaissance Center take a morally isol-
ated position (in that the project explicitly does not 
directly address in use or otherwise engage the societal 
problems within the city) and yet at the same time con-
tinues to make public moral appeals to the same people 
whose concerns they have already opted not to concern 
themselves with. The discrepancy is itself concerning, 
and the question must be raised as to whether the 
stakeholders could have garnered the public support 
necessary without fallacious moral arguments appeal-
ing to the greater public good. What is clear looking at 
the socio-political context is that they could not have 
achieved the public support for the project without the 
appeals to the greater public good, as public opposi-
tion could have halted the project through planning 
commission and city council, as well as damaged the 
public image of corporate financers. Furthermore, it 
is unclear whether the building’s stated intent was not 
just a political statement to appease locals, or whether 
the statement was something that they themselves in-
tended to uphold, hence the apparent fallaciousness 
of the claim.
It is of course possible that the project had 
greater meaning for the city than simple economic 
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regeneration. The building may have served more as a 
beacon of hope for the future, for faith in achieving a 
new and better future. There is evidence to suggest as 
much is true. Within a year of the project’s completion, 
a survey was conducted on residents’ perceptions of 
city, in which:
city suburban, black and white residents 
were expressing greater faith in the city’s fu-
ture than they did in 1976 and 1977. Only 47 
percent of those polled in 1976 felt optimistic 
about the city […] Today, the percentage has 
rise to 71 percent. Relations between the city 
police force and residents are viewed more 
positively, but confidence in public schools 
continues to slip. [paragraph] The greatest 
confidence […] was among lower-income 
adults, upper-income blacks and black 
homeowners. Those who were found to be 
most pessimistic were residents of the sub-
urbs, upper-income whites and suburban 
homeowners (Stuart 1978: A18).
The results show that city and area residents re-
mained divided, but that those who served to benefit 
the most from a renewed city were also the most optim-
istic about its potential effects. Perhaps it was that the 
suburban residents, who were more economically able, 
remained skeptical preventing them from providing 
the critical support necessary for the new project to 
survive. As it was though, the building could be mean-
ingfully held as a symbol of sorts to the inner city res-
idents of Detroit for future opportunity, as it served 
as a visual reminder that the building itself failed to 
deliver its promises.
Given the criteria for moral relationship, the basic 
mapping of relationships, what use – moral use – can 
the Renaissance Center hold?
Although the stated intentions may superficially be 
taken as morally upstanding, the intentions are testa-
ment to the lack of understanding and lack of relation-
ship between the city and city officials to its people. This 
is evidenced by the lack of response to the peoples’ pre-
cise needs and circumstances. Ford and his investors 
may have taken up the project out of a generally good 
moral sense, but the execution and underlying motiv-
ations are directly linked to an individualized sense 
of individual gain, not a shared one. This is not to say 
that moral relationship is only possible when no one 
benefits from the relationship in question, but rather 
that an individual’s personal benefit is not the basis 
for relationship.
It appears as though the individual interests of the 
project’s stakeholders were the only directly engaged 
during in the conception of the Renaissance Center. 
Taking this as the case, the building’s stated moral in-
tent is reasonably sound only insofar as an elitist under-
standing is able to capture the cares and concerns of the 
urban poor. That the stakeholders did not meaningfully 
consider the broader public interest may go someway 
to explaining why they were not able to achieve the 
project’s implied social objectives or its moral pur-
pose. Buildings depend on people to give them use, to 
give them meaning. Without engaging the people, and 
without giving them a means of engaging it, it is no 
surprise that the building quickly found itself without 
strong local support.
The precise socio-cultural circumstances in 
Detroit – whether good or bad – were not engaged, 
making it difficult to understand how a project as ambi-
tious as the Renaissance Center could have reached the 
lofty goals believed. As it was, the project was conceived 
from the perspective of the economic elite, which is to 
say, one that in this regard was not engaged with the 
circumstances of the urban poor. Thus, the building’s 
stated moral intent was reasonably sound only insofar 
as the economic and political elite’s understanding was 
able to capture the cares and concerns of the urban 
poor. The project claimed to solve the city’s social prob-
lems oddly enough through pure economic initiatives 
divorced from any social or political initiative aimed 
to directly respond to, or even acknowledge as worthy 
of recognition, the needs of the citizens.
There was no clear intent of helping the urban poor, 
particularly the economically underprivileged and 
African Americans, but rather there appears to have 
been an aim to mold the city into what a city ought 
to be socio-economically: a burgeoning economic hub 
bustling with the business activity the investors profit 
from. If the building’s intentions are understood as eco-
nomically motivated, on the basis of a trickle down 
model, the moral intention is at best suspect. As such, 
Ford’s initiative may have appeared to have good in-
tentions, but remained incapable of success because 
of a lack of genuine or substantial engagement with 
the problems it was intended to solve. The failure to 
meet its presented moral intentions was and remains 
an indication of the disparity between the building’s 
intended or claimed moral use and the resulting or 
actual moral use. Because the building did not engage 
the city’s particular circumstances, as detailed earlier, 
but rather remained wantonly ignorant, rendering any 
genuine possibility of moral use absent. Instead, the 
project can today be understood as immoral from its 
conception because there were evidently no grounds 
on which moral relationship could have taken place. 
Even on the least demanding reading of knowledge of 
others that, for Cavell, is indispensable prerequisite for 
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moral (inter)action, the City of Detroit appears to have 
acted in moral ignorance, while pursuing a course of 
moral(izing) action.16
Conclusion
Buildings can be, and often are, used in ways that 
have implicit or explicit moral significance. Whether 
an existing building has lived up to the promises of its 
private and political stakeholders, a new one can con-
ceivably meet the stakeholders’ promises, or a re-vision-
ing of an old building can re-enliven hope in a failed 
promise, buildings contribute to a moral position of 
those that design, fund and otherwise partake in the 
process of determining the form, composition, pro-
gram, and function of a building. By way of example, 
the moral relationship embodied by the Renaissance 
Center depicts vast disparity between actual and 
claimed morality. This form of analysis relies on the 
premises that buildings can embody the knowledge and 
agreement required for (moral) relationship and that 
buildings artifacts of moral relationship, and therefore 
buildings are morally appraisable. In other words, read-
ing buildings for their moral implications, leads us to 
assume that we can appraise buildings for their moral 
appropriateness. In the case of the Renaissance Center, 
we saw not just that the building has moral implication 
but that building’s immoral use maybe viewed as a cause 
of the moral relationship’s breakdown, or perhaps more 
provocatively, a symptom of moral decay.
To the degree that the moral analysis of the 
Renaissance Center has merit, the analysis certainly 
ought to have implications for contemporary Detroit. 
If we look to contemporary German society, which has 
referenced and continues to reference the atrocities of 
World War II as a way of engaging what it collectively 
intends to avoid, we see a society that engages in dif-
ficult conversations about their past and which takes 
regular action – at all levels of social life from the in-
dividual to the nation’s president – to not repeat the 
errors of the past. Detroiters it seems should similarly 
draw on their experiences, as citizens and as a collect-
ive municipal body, to intentionally work against the 
actions or lack of action, and to not recreate the same 
configurations of unemployment and exclusion that 
was and arguably remains so epidemic in the city. How 
Detroiters accomplish this wiser and morally upright 
approach is hard to say, but certainly worth concerted 
and collective effort to investigate. Mumford promises 
that this effort will breath new life, one that we all learn 
from and seek to cultivate ourselves.
Notes
1. The quotation is lightly paraphrased from Mumford, 
Lewis. The City in History. London: Harcourt, 1961: 
243.
2. This essay assumes that cities are unique in their 
composition, resisting easy generalization, and that 
the term the city carries several meanings (some-
times, several at once), including but not limited 
to the following: the political constitution, includ-
ing city officials, administrators and political fig-
ures, and the city as an institution; the people liv-
ing in the city, or the residents and inhabitants of 
the city, their social, political, religious, and other 
belief systems; and the physicality and locality of 
city, which includes the climate and geography, the 
buildings and roads, as well as the trash and pollu-
tion. Context will disambiguate the term’s intended 
meaning(s) in later sections.
3. The reference cited here are but three of numerous 
reports, editorials, and blog posts discussing the 
problem of Detroit. Typically, the laymen’s view is 
framed in terms of pure economics or race.
4. Suburbanization is a low-density configuration that 
demands wider physical mobility and typically gen-
erates economic dispersion.
5. The Kerner Report was commissioned by the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. 
The commission was appointed by President Lyndon 
Johnson with the intention of uncovering the causes 
of urban riots, of which there were many across the 
country at this time, and to recommend solutions. 
The report is named for the commissioner’s chair, 
Governor Otto Kerner, Jr.
6. See “Mapping the ‘Social Field of Whiteness’: White 
Racism as Habitus in the City where History Lives” 
by Melissa Hargrove, “Places of Inequality, Places of 
Possibility: Mapping ‘Opportunity in Geography’ 
Across Urban School Communities” by T.L. Green, 
and “Race and the Distribution of Social Physical 
Environmental Risk” by Amy Schulz by way of 
evidence that the racial segregation can be geo-
graphically understood.
7. The lack of moral relationship does not eliminate 
moral obligation in Cavell. Additionally, Cavell has 
a unique position on relationship, one that is based 
in knowing, such that knowing someone but not 
having a relationship, specifically a moral relation-
ship, does not absolve one of moral obligation to 
that person if, say, that person were in need of, say, 
protect from an attacker, or food while starving, or 
shelter from extreme weather, and so on.
8. Modern democracy does not refer to the neo-lib-
eral democracies commonly thought of today. 
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The neo-liberal democracy of contemporary so-
ciety does not appear in the United States until 
the Ronald Reagan presidency, whilst many of the 
issues Detroit suffers from took root well before 
Reagan came into office.
9. See “Buildings made Moral” by Pauline Lefebvre in 
Architecture Philosophy, for an example of another 
framework for understanding building morality.
10. See discussion on what constitutes a city (footnote 2).
11. For Wittgenstein disagreements only take place 
against the background of shared assumptions. 
Shared assumption, as the framework dictates, is 
a pre-requisite of agreement.
12. See Cavell’s discussion on the natural and conven-
tional in Chapter 5 of The Claim of Reason and Ben 
Tilghman’s essay “Architecture, Expression and 
the Understanding of a Culture” in Reflections on 
Aesthetic Judgement and Other Essays for in depth 
discussions on the traditional and conventional as 
distinct from notions of habit.
13. The Republican Party would go onto hold its 1980 
national convention in the Renaissance Center. 
Detroit local and leftist activist Grace Lee Boggs 
likely contended with the massive investment in 
the Renaissance Center and its use for elite events 
in the midst of Detroit’s woes. Evidence of this hy-
pothesized position can be found in the following 
quotation: “We must give up many of the things 
which this country has enjoyed at the expense of 
damning over one-third of the world into a state 
of underdevelopment, ignorance, disease and early 
death” (Boggs, Boggs 1974: 140). One of the things 
we must give up is luxury conference centers, or in 
the very least prioritize the well-being of all over the 
creation of luxury spaces.
14. The funds raised totaled $337 million (approxim-
ately $1.3 billion today adjusted for inflation) – a 
considerable sum of money in the midst of a local 
economic depression.
15. The reading of the Renaissance Center in this 
way – a commonly accepted mode of analysis in 
the architecture discipline – is deterministic in ori-
gin and could be related to Heidegger’s notion of 
dwelling, in the sense that the way we live shapes 
our buildings and vice versa. The main difference 
between the Heideggerian model and the Cavellian 
one is the location of morality. For Heidegger it is 
moral to have an intimate symbiotic relationship 
with building, whereas for Cavell simply having the 
relationship itself is not enough. Only certain ways 
of engaging in the relationship are moral, whereas 
others can be immoral or lacking morality. For an 
in depth exploration into the relationship between 
Heidegger and Cavell, see Cavell’s own analysis in 
part one of The Claim of Reason.
16. In this sense it fails the third criteria, in which it 
fails not only the other but also itself in not recog-
nizing or understanding their own position.
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